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NOTE
EXTRAJUDICIAL TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURE OF
MEDICAL CONFIDENCES: A PHYSICIAN'S
CIVIL LIABILITY
"[A] physician can, in a gossip session in the locker room at
the Country Club, tell all present that John Doe, a married man,
has contracted some loathsome disease. John Doe has no remedy."'
f] True LI False
INTRODUCTION
THE answer to the question, of course, is easy if the physician toldTa damaging lie. But what if he told the absolute truth? The
real difficulty would arise if one were asked to explain, in 25 words
or less, or in a concise appellate brief, the legal- not the moral -
basis for one's answer. In attempting such an explanation one would
encounter some firmly entrenched legal myths and considerable
confusion concerning the question of the physician's liability or
non-liability in a civil action.
This note examines a physician's civil liability for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences. Is the physician liable?
If so, under what theory of law? Is there a common law liability,
or is a statute necessary? If a statute is necessary, precisely what
type is required? What is, or should be the function of the statute?
Does it create a statutory right to a civil action, or does it serve some
lesser purpose?
The following analysis of the American cases indicates that
primarily during the last decade there has developed a coherent body
of American judicial opinions which would hold a physician
pecuniarily liable, in a civil action, for extrajudicial truthful dis-
closure of professional secrets or medical confidences, absent an
overriding duty to society or third parties to make such disclosure.
In order to avoid hopeless entanglement in irrelevant bodies
of law, it is necessary to limit the analysis severely. First, the scope
of the analysis is limited to extrajudicial disclosures. There is an
entirely separate body of law, mostly statutory, dealing with testi-
I Lipscomb, Privileged Communicaions Staute - Sword and Shield, 16 Miss. L.J.
181, 182 (1944).
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mony by physicians during judicial proceedings. Second, the discus-
sion is restricted to truthful disclosures. The law of libel and slander,
which concerns itself with falsehoods, is only tangentially relevant.
Third, cases on invasion of privacy by publication in newspapers,
magazines, professional journals and other media have been excluded
from consideration. The physician's duty not to disclose professional
confidences to anyone is not the sole controlling question in such
cases, and this basic issue is much too easily obscured by the other
issues inherent in invasion of privacy litigation. Fourth, the discussion
is limited to situations where a patient-physician relationship exists
between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, a case is beyond the
scope of the analysis if the court did not consider the plaintiff to
have been a patient of the defendant physician,' or if the disclosures
were made by servants or officials of medical institutions, acting in
some administrative capacity, rather than by a person acting truly
in the capacity of a physician.' In essence, then, this note is limited
to cases in which a doctor, out of court, tells a third party the truth
about his patient.
I. THE SPECULATIVE PERIOD: 1920 TO CIRCA 1960
Prior to 1920 no American court seems to have been confronted
with the issue of a physician's liability for extrajudicial truthful
disclosure of medical confidences. Smith v. Driscoll,4 decided in
1917, is often cited because of its eloquent dictum that a patient
has a cause of action for extrajudicial disclosure of medical con-
fidences. However, in that case the disclosure was actually made
during a judicial proceeding. The first case in point5 was Simonsen
v. Swenson,0 decided in 1920. The next reported decision on this
issue did not occur until Berry v. Moench7 in 1958, followed by
Clark v. Geraci8 in 1960. For the forty intervening years, the dia-
logue on the question of a physician's liability for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences was left to the legal
scholars. A sampling of the writings of these gentlemen, some of
them giants in their field, gives an illuminating insight into the atti-
2 Hammer v. Polski, 36 Misc. 2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term, N.Y. County,
1962).
3 Tooley v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1963);
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div.
970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
4 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917).
5 Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 617 (1943).
6 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
78 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
8 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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tudes which prevailed for some forty years before all but one of the
cases in point were decided. Also, it is only reasonable to assume
that some of the thoughts and theories of the scholars influenced at
least the arguments of counsel in later litigation if not, directly, the
decisions of the courts.
Earlier skepticism regarding the ability of a patient to maintain
a successful action against his physician for disclosure of medi-
cal confidences slowly gave way to guarded and moderate optimism.
In 1943, Chafee was quite pessimistic when he said: "While the
law has been so solicitous about the doctor's duty to keep silent on
the witness-stand, it has done little to protect the patient's medical
secrets from disclosure to the world in general." 9 Nine years later,
Guttmacher and Weihofen still saw little hope for the patient's
protection under existing law: "In the main, the patient's confidences
are protected against disclosure outside the courtroom primarily by
the code of professional ethics rather than by the law.' " °
In 1953, DeWitt saw a legal basis for civil liability in the sta-
tutes which govern the licensing of physicians, where the statute
provides for revocation of the license for unprofessional conduct
such as willful betrayal of a medical confidence.11 DeWitt reasoned:
"Statutes of this type impose a positive duty upon the physician not
to voluntarily disclose the confidences of the patients; accordingly,
a breach of this duty may under certain circumstances afford redress
in a civil action . 12 However, six years later he still felt obliged
to make the over-all assessment that "[t]here are today [1959] few
medical confidences that can really be kept secret except, of course,
in a court of law where justice cries out for the facts."'" This state-
ment was probably not intended as a reappraisal of his earlier views
concerning the significance of statutes which govern the licensing
of physicians. Professor DeWitt was writing on a statute of an en-
tirely different type, the physician-patient privilege statute, under
which the patient can have his physician's testimony excluded during
a trial.14 He had earlier in the article made the point that such
statutes do not control a physician's extrajudicial behavior, 15 and in
9 Chafee, supra note 5, at 616.
10 M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 276 (1952).
11 DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law: The Conflict Between Dual Allegiances, 5 W.
RES. L. Rav. 5 (1953).
12 Id. at 21.
13 DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, 10 W. RES. L.
REv. 488, 500 (1959).
14 For a discussion of the relevance of the two types of statutes, see the text accompany-
ing notes 64-73 infra.
15 DeWitt, supra note 13, at 491.
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the last sentence of the article he advocates that the physician-patient
privilege during trials be abolished. 6
While Dr. Louis J. Regan's work, Doctor and Patient and the
Law, published in 1956, merely indicated a possibility of physicians
being liable for extrajudicial disclosures, 17 Shartel and Plant, writing
in 1959, were cautiously optimistic - from the patient's point of
view. After discussing the impact of various types of statutes, they
concluded:
As regards the liability of a physician for damages resulting
from the disclosure of information about a patient, there is not too
much direct authority. But in view of all the ways, above men-
tioned, in which disclosure is condemned, barred, and penalized,
we think it is almost certain that the courts will recognize the
physician's liability when occasion arises.'
8
By 1962, Stetler and Moritz were in a position to make an assessment
on the basis of case law:
The belief that the law offers the patient no protection against
unauthorized disclosures has created confusion concerning a physi-
cian's civil liability for such disclosures. Although only a few cases
have been found which directly deal with this issue, they indicate
that a wrongful disclosure may give rise to a civil action for damages
directly caused by the violation of confidence. 19
As can be expected, however, there were those who disagreed with
the above views,20 and it is not intended to convey the idea that there
was, in 1962, or that there is now unanimity on the question of a
physician's liability for extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical
confidences. Quite to the contrary, one purpose of the preceding dis-
cussion has been to show that, around the beginning of this decade,
it was not at all settled law in the United States that a physician was
liable for damages arising out of a betrayal of a professional secret.
The second purpose was to point out the relative preoccupation with
statutes as a basis for liability. This trend started with the first, and
for a long time the only case in point, Simonsen v. Swenson,2' de-
cided in 1920. Nebraska happened to have a statute2 which the
court viewed as permitting the revocation of a physician's license if
he betrayed a professional secret.23 The court thought that breach
of the positive duty imposed by such a statute would give rise to a
16 Id. at 500.
17 L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 104 (3d ed. 1956).
18 B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 49 (1959).
19 
C. STETLER & A. MoRITz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 271 (4th ed. 1962 ).
2 See Baldwin, Confidentiality Between Physician and Patient, 22 MD. L. REV. 181
(1962).
21 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
2 NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 148 (1943).
23 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
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civil action for damages. 24 The scholars, apparently, thought this
to be a reasonable and tenable rationale upon which to predicate a
physician's liability in a civil action.2
II. THE CASE LAW
A. History and Resume
There are only seven American cases directly in point on the
question of a physician's civil liability to his patient for extrajudicial
truthful disclosure of medical confidences. The cases are set out
below in chronological order.
1. Simonsen v. Swenson, Nebraska, 192026
The physician advised a hotel manager that the patient had a
communicable disease. The court found that under the facts the
physician was privileged to make the disclosure because of an over-
riding duty to society to prevent the spread of infectious disease.27
2. Berry v. Moench, Utah, 195828
The physician provided to another physician, a friend of the
plaintiff's bride's family, derogatory information obtained while
treating the plaintiff. The case was remanded to determine whether
the facts existed which would make the disclosure privileged because
of an overriding duty to a third party.
29
3. Clark v. Geraci, New York, 196030
Upon request of the patient, the physician certified that the
patient's absences from work were due to illness. Later, and over
the objections of the patient, the physician admitted to the employer
that the patient's illness was due to alcoholism. The disclosure was
held to have been privileged because of an overriding duty to a third
party, to whom a partial disclosure had previously been made at
the request of the patient."1
4. Hague v. Williams, New Jersey, 196232
The defendant physician disclosed to life insurer that plaintiff's
deceased child had heart disease. The disclosure was held to have
24 Id.
25 See DeWitt, supra note 11, at 21.
26 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
27 Id. at 228, 177 N.W. at 832.
2 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
29Id. at 201, 331 P.2d at 820.
30 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
31 Id. at 794, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
32 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
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been privileged, because of a supervening interest of society in dis-
closure after a patient's physical condition is made an element of a
claim.38
5. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Ohio, 1965"4
The physician disclosed confidential medical information to a
hospital's accident insurer. The court held Ohio's public policy to
impose a duty upon the physician to maintain professional confi-
dences and found no overriding duty to a third party under which
such disclosure would be privileged. Judgment for plaintiff-patient.
6. Quarles v. Sutherland, Tennessee, 1965"5
The physician provided medical reports to a store against which
the patient was about to bring a personal injury action. After an
accident in the store, the plaintiff was taken to the defendant
physician, who did not inform her that he was the store's regular
physician. The court held there was no basis at law for a cause of
action against the physician under the circumstances of this case.
7. Curry v. Corn, New York, 196630
The physician revealed to the plaintiff's husband information
obtained while treating the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the
physician knew that her husband would use the information in a
pending matrimonial action. The disclosure was held to have been
privileged, on the theory that a husband has a right to information
regarding illness of his wife which might affect the marital relation-
ship.
Of the seven cases considered, all but two, Berry v. Moench and
Hammonds v. Aetna, were won by the defendant doctors. In only
one case, Curry v. Corn, did the court not reach the basic issue of a
physician's liability for disclosing medical confidences. 7 In the
other six cases the courts felt compelled to pass on the question of a
physician's civil liability for such breach of a confidence.
In five of the six cases in which the question was reached, the
courts conceded to the patient the basic right to recover damages in
a civil action from a physician who makes an extrajudicial truthful
disclosure of a medical confidence.38 The courts found, however,
33 Id. at 336, 181 A.2d 349.
34243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). See 11 VILL. REV. 662 (1966).
35215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965). See 79 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1966);
32 TENN. L. REv. 652 (1965).
36 35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).
37 Id.
38 Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Simon-
sen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J.
328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
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that in three of the above cases the physicians were privileged to make
the particular disclosures because of a duty to third parties or to
society which overrode the duty to the patient to keep silent. "
Of the six courts which reached the question, only one, the court
in Quarles v. Sutherland,4" denied that the patient had any enforce-
able rights as to extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confi-
dences.4 And even in that case it was conceded by the court that there
might be a possibility of an action on the contract, where there is a
full contractual physician-patient relationship with compensation .42
The court seemed to think that the defendant was not contractually
bound because, as the facts appeared to the court, the plaintiff-
patient did not attempt to compensate the physician.4"
In summary, five out of six American courts which have ad-
dressed themselves to the issue agree that, in the absence of a privi-
lege based on an overriding duty to third parties or society, a physi-
cian is pecuniarily liable to his patient in a civil action for damages
arising out of an extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confi-
dences.
B. The Basis for a Physician's Liability
While the courts are generally agreed on the basic question
whether or not a physician is liable for a breach of professional
confidence, there is considerable divergence of opinion concerning
exactly what constitutes the legal foundation for a physician's civil
liability for extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences.
This subject will be discussed in three categories: (1) common law,
(2) statutes, and (3) the ethical standards of the medical profession.
1. The Myth of the Duchess of Kingston: Is There a Common
Law Basis for Liability?
Four of the seven cases under consideration either declare or
intimate that there was no liability for extrajudicial truthful dis-
closures under the common law.44 This notion seems to stem from
a ruling on a point of evidence made in 1776 in the House of .ords,
39 Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) ; Hague v.
Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962) ; Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc.
2d 791, 794-95, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568-69 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
40 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965).
41 Id. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
4 Id. at 657-58, 389 S.W.2d at 252.
43 Id.
"Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 226, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920); Clark v.
Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 792, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Quarles v.
Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 657, 389 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1965).
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during the trial of the Duchess of Kingston for bigamy.45 Doctor
Caesar Hawkins was asked on the witness stand whether he knew of
any marriage between the defendant and the Earl of Bristol. Dr.
Hawkins attempted to invoke the physician-patient privilege. He
said:
I do not know how far anything that has come before me in a
confidential trust in my profession should be disclosed, consistent
with my professional honour.46
Lord Mansfield then made the following ruling, in which all
the other lords acquiesced:
[A] surgeon has no privilege, where it is a material question,
in a civil or criminal cause, to know whether parties were married,
or whether a child was born, to say that his introduction to the
parties was in the course of his profession, and in that way he came
to the knowledge of it. I take it for granted, that if Mr. Hawkins
understands that, it is a satisfaction to him, and a clear justification
to all the world.47
So far, Lord Mansfield had simply ruled that, during a trial, a
physician must answer questions even though his answers might
reveal information obtained by the physician while treating a patient.
In Quarles v. Sutherland this ruling was correctly cited for the propo-
sition that there was no physician-patient privilege, as to testimony
during trials, under the common law.48 Lord Mansfield, however,
did not stop there, he continued:
if a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure
he would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion;
but, to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law
of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any
indiscretion whatever. 49
Thereupon, the question was repeated, and Dr. Hawkins
answered it.50
In this second part, Lord Mansfield clearly limited his ruling
to the question of evidence during trials. If Lord Mansfield's ruling
were to be accepted as an indication of a physician's liability for
disclosing professional secrets under the common law, it would have
to be accepted as dictum to the effect that the common law recognized
the duty of the physician not to make voluntary extrajudicial dis-
closures of confidential information obtained in the practice of his
profession. Nevertheless, in Quarles v. Sutherland, the court deduced,
from Lord Mansfield's ruling, a common law rule to the effect that
4 Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. State Trials 355, 573 (1776), reprinted
in Notable British Trial Series (Melville ed. 1927).
46 Id. at 572.
47 Id. at 573.
4 215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
49 20 How. State Trials at 573 (emphasis added).
bo Id. at 574-76.
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physicians were not liable for extrajudicial disclosures of confidential
information obtained while treating their patients.5 The court seems
to have simply disregarded the second part of Lord Mansfield's
ruling, although it is quoted in the opinion.5 2 The court also seems
to have overlooked, in its own reasoning, the distinction between a
rule of evidence and substantive law, although it admonished the
plaintiff for attempting to base a cause of action on a rule of
evidence.53
There is no record of any case at English common law which
decided the issue of a physician's liability for disclosing professional
confidences.5 4 There are, however, two Scottish cases where the
courts held such actions maintainable.
55
In summary, while there are no cases at English common law
which either expressly allow or deny the patient a cause of action for
extrajudicial truthful disclosure of medical confidences, there is
Lord Mansfield's dictum which condemns such disclosures; and there
are two Scottish cases where the actions for such disclosures were
held to be maintainable.
2. Statutory Bases for Liability
There are two types of statutes which have had an impact upon
the physician's liability for extrajudicial disclosure of professional
confidences:
(a) Privilege statutes, which generally provide that, unless the
patient consents, a physician may not give evidence during trials
concerning information obtained while treating the patient.
(b) Licensing statutes or regulations, which define professional
standards prerequisite to obtaining and retaining a license to practice
medicine, and which classify betrayal of professional secrets as indi-
cating unworthiness to retain a license to practice medicine.
In six of the seven cases under discussion the courts considered
the question of how a privilege statute affects the civil liability of a
physician for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences.
In Quarles v. Sutherland the absence of such a statute was held to
prevent a non-paying patient from maintaining an action.5" In New
Jersey, which did not have a privilege statute, the Hague v. Williams
court thought the existence or absence of a privilege statute to be
51 215 Tenn. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
2Id. at 655-56, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
3 Id. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 252.
54 Note, Professional Secrecy, 174 L.T. 187, 188 (1932).
SA.B. v. C.D., 14 Sess. Cas. 177 (Scot. 1851), discussed in DeWitt, supra note 11,
at 20, and in Note, Professional Secrecy, 174 L.T. 187 (1932); A.B. v. C.D., 7
Fraser's Rep. 5th Ser. 72 (Scot. 1904).
56 215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
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only an indication of the general public policy and thinking in regard
to extrajudicial disclosures of professional confidences. 57 In both
Berry v. Moench58 and Hammonds v. Aetna5" the courts held privi-
lege statutes to be a positive expression of their states' public policy
regarding a physician's duty to maintain professional confidences,
the violation of which would provide a patient with a cause of action.
In Curry v. Corn the court admitted it was inclined to view the
privilege statute as governing merely the reception of evidence, and
not as creating a cause of action against the physician. The court did
not feel obliged, however, to take a position on the question."0
In the first American case on the question, Simonsen v. Swenson,
the court held the Nebraska privilege statute to be only a rule of
evidence and, as such, not relevant to the issue of a physician's pecun-
iary liability for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences."'
While it is clear that privilege statutes only enunciate a rule of
evidence, such statutes are, after all, a public recognition of the
special nature of the doctor-patient relationship. When, as a matter
of public policy, this relationship is so assiduously protected that a
doctor is prohibited from testifying in court concerning information
obtained during the course of treating a patient, it does not seem
inconsistent to argue that the same public policy implies further
restrictions upon the doctor's right to reveal confidences from his
patient. What may not be revealed in court should not be permitted
as the subject of casual conversation in the locker room at the
Country Club.
The impact of a licensing statute was considered by the courts
in three cases. Tennessee has a licensing statute ;62 however, the
Quarles v. Sutherland court did not rely upon this statute in its
decision."3 In Simonsen v. Swenson the court stated that the Nebraska
licensing statute imposed a positive duty upon the physician not to
disclose professional confidences, and that a breach of such duty
would give rise to a civil action for damages."4 The Hammonds v.
Aetna court held the Ohio licensing statute, like the privilege
statute, to be a positive expression of that state's public policy regard-
ing a physician's liability.6" In Clark v. Geraci the court viewed New
York licensing regulations as an expression of a standard upon which
57 37 N.J. at 333, 181 A.2d at 348.
88 8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 817.
59 243 F. Supp. at 797.
60 35 U.S.L.W. at 2011.
81 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
52 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-618,-619 (1965).
63 215 Tenn. at 656, 389 S.W.2d at 251.
8 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
65 243 F. Supp. at 800-01.
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a patient has a right to rely, and as implying a duty of secrecy.6"
Treating licensing statutes as one of the expressions of a standard
of public policy upon which patients have a right to rely appears to
be a sound theory.
3. Medical Standards of Ethics as a Basis for Liability
In determining a physician's liability for extrajudicial disclosure
of professional confidences, three courts took into consideration the
published ethical standards of the medical profession itself. These
standards are embodied in a portion of the Oath of Hippocrates:
"Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in
connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which ought not
to be spoken abroad I will not divulge as recommending that all such
should be kept secret." 7 The relevant portion of the Principles of
Medical Ethics (1957) of the A.M.A. states: "A physician may not
reveal the Confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical
attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of
patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the
community."6"
In Hammonds v. Aetna the medical profession's promulgated
standards were held to amount to an implied promise of secrecy on
the part of the doctors, which public policy demanded they obey.69
The Hague v. Williams court stated that the ethical concepts pro-
pounded by the medical profession express an "inherent legal obli-
gation which a physician owes to his patient,"7 and viewed these
ethical concepts, by themselves, as a basis for liability. In Clark v.
Geraci the court viewed the Oath of Hippocrates as an indication or
expression of a standard upon which a patient has a right to rely.
71
There seems little to criticize in the view expressed in these three
cases that the medical profession should be bound by the ethical
standards which it so publicly expounds.
Ill. TYPES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF MEDICAL CONFIDENCE
While comments, articles and medicolegal texts have proposed
several theories,72 the courts themselves have not extensively dis-
6 29 Misc. 2d at 792-93, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
67 Quoted at Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
6 Quoted at Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 332, 181 A.2d 345, 347 (1962).
69 243 F. Supp. at 796.
70 37 N.J. at 335, 181 A.2d at 348.
71 29 Misc. 2d at 792, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
7See B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 49 (1959); 79 HARv.
L. REV. 1723 (1966) ; 11 VILL. L. REv. 662 ('1966).
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cussed the precise type of action which a patient should bring if he
has been injured by his physician's disclosure of professional confi-
dences. The courts in Simonsen v. Swenson78 and Hague v. Wil-
liams74 simply speak of a breach of the duty to keep confidences
secret, and in Curry v. Corn the matter is not discussed at all.
7
1
Berry v. Moench is an action for libel in which the court held that
where a patient-doctor relationship is involved, truth would not
constitute a defense.7  Actions in tort or contract were suggested by
the court in Hammonds v. Aetna.77 The Quarles v. Sutherland court
conceded the possibility of an action on the contract, but only in the
case of a full contractual physician-patient relationship with compen-
sation paid by the patient.78 In Clark v. Geraci the court thought that
the patient should be able to maintain an action for malpractice.7 1
An action based upon an unwarranted disclosure of medical
confidences has a number of elements in common with the ordinary
malpractice suit. Such a disclosure involves a deviation from the
standard of the particular school of medicine which the physician
follows," and from the standard of physicians in good standing
within the community.8 ' The basis of the action is also a breach of a
professional duty.8 2 The usual malpractice suit, however, is based
upon a duty to exercise reasonable care as judged by standards of
skill and knowledge commonly possessed by the medical profession.
It should be apparent that questions of knowledge and skill have no
relevance to a physician's duty of secrecy and should not be raised
in an action based upon a disclosure of professional confidences.
IV. DAMAGES
In each of the seven cases discussed the plaintiff patients were
clearly injured by their physician's disclosure of medical confidences.
There is little discussion in these cases, however, of the measure of
damages by which such injury is to be compensated. In Simonsen v.
Swenson it was held that a physician's breach of the duty of secrecy
"would give rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flowing
104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
74 37 N.J. at 335-36, 181 A.2d at 348-49.
5 35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).
76 8 Utah 2d at 196, 331 P.2d at 816-17.
77 243 F. Supp. at 801-02.
7 215 Tenn. at 657. 389 S.W.2d at 252.
79 29 Misc. 2d at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Contra, Hammer v. Polski, 36 Misc. 2d
482 '(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term, N.Y. County, 1962) (dictum) (disclosure during
judicial proceeding, physician-patient relationship did not exist).
80 See cases cited at 41 Am. JuL. Physicians & Surgeons § 85 n. 9 (1942).
8 1 See cases cited at 41 AM. Jug. Physicians & Surgeons § 82 (1942).
n 1. § 78.
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from such wrong." 88 The Hammonds v. Aetna court expressed ap-
proval of an "action for damages directly caused by the violation of
confidence." '84 In Berry v. Moench it was the court's opinion that "an
action would lie for any injury suffered,18 5 and it was indicated that
the patient should be protected from disclosures which might be
"embarrassing and harmful to him."'86
It remains to be seen if any court will in the future allow an
action for breach of a medical confidence resulting in no actual injury
to the patient. There is no readily apparent reason for doing so. The
patient's rights can be adequately protected by compensating him
for any personal, social, or economic damages resulting from the
disclosure. There is no reason for the courts to assume control of the
ethical standards of the American Medical Association in cases
involving a minor deviation from accepted medical standards and no
actual injury to a patient.
V. DEFENSES
Of the seven cases under discussion, five were won by the
defendant physicians interposing one or more of three distinct types
of defense:
(1) That there simply is no cause of action, or legal remedy,
for extrajudicial disclosure of professional confidences. This was held
to be a sufficient defense in only one case, Quarles v. Sutherland, and
was limited to a non-paying patient.8 7 In Curry v. Corn8 the question
was not ruled upon, and the other five cases expressly reject this
defense.
(2) That the patient completely waived his rights regarding
disclosure of professional confidences when he requested the physi-
cian to make a partial disclosure of confidential information. This
defense was interposed in only one case, Clark v. Geraci, and was
held to be a good and sufficient defense against a malpractice
action.""
(3) That the physician was privileged to make the particular
disclosure because of a duty to third parties, which was greater than
the duty to the patient to remain silent. This defense was allowed in
Simonsen v. Swenson where the purpose of the communication was
8 104 Neb. at 227, 177 N.W. at 832.
84 243 F. Supp. at 802.
85 8 Utah 2d at 193, 331 P.2d at 817.
86 Id.
87 215 Tenn. at 657, 389 S.W.2d at 250.
8 35 U.S.L.W. 2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1966).
8 29 Misc. 2d at 794, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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to prevent the spread of contagious disease.90 In Clark v. Geraci the
court found a duty on the part of the physician to make a full dis-
closure where a partial disclosure made at the request of the patient
would result in a fraud.9' Hague v. Williams recognizes an over-
riding duty to make a disclosure to a third party where the patient's
physical condition has become the element of a claim.92 The duty to
make a disclosure to a third party when the patient's physical condi-
tion is made an element of a claim is expressly rejected in Hammonds
v. Aetna."8 In Curry v. Corn the court found the physician to have a
duty to inform a husband of an illness on the part of his wife which
might affect the marital relationship.94 In Berry v. Moench the court
describes a physician's conditional privilege to make extrajudicial
disclosures in the following terms: "Where life, safety, well-being
or other important interest is in jeopardy, one having information
which could protect against the hazard, may have a conditional
privilege to reveal information for such purpose[s] ..... 9' Thus,
in six of the seven cases under discussion, the courts expressly recog-
nized an overriding duty to a third party as a good and sufficient de-
fense in an action based upon an extrajudicial disclosure of confiden-
tial information by a physician.
The defense of privilege to make a communication because of
an overriding duty to a third party is part of the more fully developed
law of slander and libel.96 The courts have not hesitated, however, to
apply this defense in these actions for truthful disclosures of medical
confidences where no libel or slander was involved. With respect to
the defense of privilege, a physician who tells the truth should be
entitled to, at least, the same protection as one who tells a falsehood.
CONCLUSION
It is concluded that patients now have a judicially recognized
right, and physicians have a corresponding judicially recognized
duty, under which the physician must not make extrajudicial dis-
closures of information obtained while treating the patient, unless
the physician is privileged to make the disclosure because of an over-
riding duty to society or third parties. The violation of such right,
9 104 Neb. at 226, 177 N.W. at 832.
91 29 Misc. 2d at 793, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
92 37 N.J. at 336. 181 A.2d at 349.
93 243 F. Supp. at 801.
94 35 U.S.L.W. at 2011.
95 8 Utah 2d at 197, 331 P.2d at 817-18.
9For full discussion in regard to the privilege of statements made by physicians, see
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 325 (1960) (commenting on Berry v. Moench); Baldwin, supra
note 20; and DeWitt, supra note 11, at 25-27.
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and the breach of such duty, give rise to a civil action for damages.
The patient, however, may waive his rights concerning professional
secrets by requesting the physician to make a partial disclosure, if it
appears later that such partial disclosure would operate as a fraud.
The majority, and better reasoned view bases the patient's cause
of action on a violation of professional standards to which a physi-
cian has a duty to adhere, and upon which a patient is entitled to rely.
This duty on the part of the physician may be inferred either from
the public policy statements in privilege and licensing statutes or from
the professional standards of conduct promulgated by the medical
profession itself.
Rolf A. Hanning
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